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Background: Recently, individualized or personalized medicine (PM) has become a buzz word in the academic as
well as public debate surrounding health care. However, PM lacks a clear definition and is open to interpretation.
This conceptual vagueness complicates public discourse on chances, risks and limits of PM. Furthermore, stakeholders
might use it to further their respective interests and preferences. For these reasons it is important to have a shared
understanding of PM. In this paper, we present a sufficiently precise as well as adequate definition of PM with the
potential of wide acceptance.
Methods: For this purpose, in a first step a systematic literature review was conducted to understand how PM is
actually used in scientific practice. PubMed was searched using the keywords “individualized medicine”, “individualised
medicine”, “personalized medicine” and “personalised medicine” connected by the Boolean operator OR. A data
extraction tabloid was developed putting forward a means/ends-division. Full-texts of articles containing the search
terms in title or abstract were screened for definitions. Definitions were extracted; according to the means/ends
distinction their elements were assigned to the corresponding category. To reduce complexity of the resulting list,
summary categories were developed inductively from the data using thematic analysis. In a second step, six well-known
criteria for adequate definitions were applied to these categories to derive a so-called precising definition.
Results: We identified 2457 articles containing the terms PM in title or abstract. Of those 683 contained a definition of
PM and were thus included in our review. 1459 ends and 1025 means were found in the definitions. From these we
derived the precising definition: PM seeks to improve stratification and timing of health care by utilizing biological
information and biomarkers on the level of molecular disease pathways, genetics, proteomics as well as metabolomics.
Conclusions: Our definition includes the aspects that are specific for developments labeled as PM while, on the other
hand, recognizing the limits of these developments. Furthermore, it is supported by the quantitative analysis of PM
definitions in the literature, which suggests that it it is widely acceptable and thus has the potential to avoid the above
mentioned issues.
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In recent years, individualized or personalized medicine
(IM/PM)a has become a buzz word in the academic as
well as public debate surrounding health care. Promising
to make health care more effective and efficient by tai-
lored medical interventions it has become one of the
core areas of public research funding and pharmaceutical
research investment [1]. However, PM lacks a clear def-
inition and is open to interpretation [2]. Consequently, a* Correspondence: sebastian.schleidgen@med.lmu.de
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article, unless otherwise stated.whole continuum of PM understandings exists, in which
three main positions can be identified: (a) PM is not a
new concept as medicine has always been individualized,
(b) PM is holistic health care centered around the needs
of the individual patient and (c) PM is treatment tar-
geted at stratified subgroups (e.g. pharmacogenetics) [3].
The prevailing vagueness of the term poses several
problems. First and foremost, it unduly complicates pub-
lic discourse on chances, risks and limits of PM: if the
meaning of a term like PM is not clearly defined, it is
trivially impossible to debate questions of its matter as
well as its (future) handling. As a consequence, it istral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly cited. The Creative Commons Public
mons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this
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effectiveness as well as ethical acceptability of research
on and provision of PM. Furthermore, stakeholders
might utilize the terms’ vagueness to further their re-
spective, especially economic interests and preferences.
In the medical context, however, this seems to be mor-
ally unacceptable; on the contrary, medical actions ul-
timately must be directed towards the patients’ needs.
Finally, PM’s underspecification may lead to unwar-
ranted fears of patients as well as unfounded hopes like
a perfectly tailored or patient-centered medicine [4,5].
Against this background, the goal of this paper is to help
structuring the debate over PM’s meaning by developing
a sufficiently precise definition, which is formally ad-
equate while at the same time reflecting the actual
scientific possibilities as well as limitations of medical
measures labeled as PM.
A definition declares that a term (the definiendum) is
equivalent with another set of terms whose meaning is
well-established (the definiens) [6,7]. Hurley [8] differen-
tiates, among others, between stipulative, lexical and
precising definitions. While a lexical definition simply
tries to capture the way a word is commonly used, a sti-
pulative definition arbitrarily assigns a meaning to a cer-
tain expression, whereas a precising definition tries to
reduce the vagueness of a term used in practice: “[a pre-
cising definition] differs from a stipulative definition be-
cause its definiendum is not a new term, but one whose
usage is established, although vague. The makers of a
precising definition, therefore, are not free to assign
any meaning they choose to the definiendum. They
must remain true to established usage as far as that is
possible. The aim is to make a known term more pre-
cise. At the same time they must go beyond estab-
lished usage if the vagueness of the definiendum is to
be reduced” [9].
As the term PM is already established in public dis-
course, however vaguely defined, the goal of this paper
can only be to derive a precising definition. For this pur-
pose, we first have to describe the current usage of the
term. As one central goal of our paper consists in clari-
fying the actual possibilities and limitations of PM, we
decided to analyse its current usage in the sciences. This
decision followed the assumption that the scientific de-
bate on PM centers on its actual state-of-the-art. Ana-
lyzing the stakeholders’ discourse, on the other hand,
would potentially have captured the respective hopes
and interests instead of the actual development labeled
as PM. Accordingly, we conducted a systematic review
of definitions appearing in the academic literature. Based
on those findings, in a second step, we developed a pre-
cising definition of PM which is formally adequate as
well as sufficiently precise and hence can be regarded as
an adequate basis for public discourse on PM.Methods
For our systematic review, PubMed was searched using
the keywords “individualized medicine”, “individualised
medicine”, “personalized medicine” and “personalised
medicine” connected by the Boolean operator OR. We
refrained from including MeSH-terms in the search
strategy as the term “individualized medicine” specified
in the thesaurus of PubMed contains a specific defin-
ition, namely “a therapeutic approach tailoring therapy
for genetically defined subgroups of patients”. Including
MeSH-terms would therefore have pre-selected certain
articles according to this understanding of PM. Excluding
MeSH-terms, on the contrary, allowed us to stay open to
alternative understandings of PM. We only searched titles
and abstracts to identify those articles in which PM is the
main focus. We assumed that those articles were more
likely to contain a definition of PM. We did not restrict
the date of publication; our last research was conducted
on August 15, 2012. Furthermore, we included only arti-
cles written in English as our goal was to capture the
international debate. Subsequently, we checked full-text
availability of the articles identified via the Bavarian State
Library, which provides access to one of the most compre-
hensive online journal collections as well as print media in
Germany. Where full-texts were not available, we con-
tacted the authors given contact details were provided.
A data extraction tabloid was developed which puts
forward a means/ends-division. This decision is based
on the assumption that medical interventions are de-
fined by the means they employ to reach certain ends. A
stethoscope, for instance, is not defined by its form or
color or technical details – they may vary –, but rather
that it allows listening to internal sounds (means) to de-
tect pathologies of the lung, heart or abdomen (ends).
Articles available were screened for definitions by SS
and TB, definitions were extracted using the extraction
tabloid by TB. This resulted in a list of ends and means
constitutive for PM. For instance, from the definition
“The purpose of personalized medicine is to identify the
optimal treatment for each individual patient to maximize
treatment benefit and minimize adverse effects. To
achieve this goal, informative biomarkers need to be iden-
tified to stratify patients for specific therapies” [10] we de-
rived the ends:
(a) to identify the optimal treatment for each individual
patient;
(b) to maximize treatment benefit;
(c) to minimize adverse effects
as well as the means:
(a) identification of informative biomarkers
(b) stratification of patients.
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thors’ understanding of what constitutes ends and
means. To reduce complexity of the resulting list, sum-
mary categories were developed inductively from the
data using thematic analysis adapted to the research aim
[11]. Two researchers, SS and CK, independently derived
categories from the data. In case their assessments dif-
fered, discrepancies were discussed and resolved consen-
sually (thereby ensuring inter-coder reliability). Where
technical details were not clear, a medical expert was
consulted for clarification.
Results
All in all, we identified 2457 articles containing the
terms PM in title or abstract. 145 articles were not writ-
ten in English and therefore excluded from further ana-
lysis. Full-texts were available for 1443 papers. Of those
articles 683 contained a definition of PM and were thus
included in our review (see also Figure 1).b
In our sample, PM was first mentioned in 1971, but
the discourse on PM did not significantly intensify be-
fore 1999/2000. Figure 2 provides an overview of the an-
nual growth rates of publications on PM in the period ofFigure 1 Flow diagram of data collection process according to the PR2000-2011 (we leave out 2012 because we only included
articles published before August 15th): the average
growth rate of literature written on PM was 49% per
year. This is significantly higher than the annual incre-
ment of PubMed’s database in the period of 2000-2011,
whose average growth rate was 4.8%. The growth rate of
over 160% in 2002 might be most reasonably understood
in the context of the completion of the human genome
project and the resulting hopes in gene-based medicine.
Until 2009, each year an average of 60.4% of publica-
tions on PM included a definition. That might indicate
awareness among scientists that the term still lacks a
shared definition (Figure 3). For the same reason, how-
ever, it is problematic that almost half of the authors did
not explicate their understanding of PM, thereby pur-
porting a common understanding. Additionally, in the
last three years an average of only 39.3% of publications in-
cluded a definition which might suggest a decrease in
awareness of the terms’ prevailing vagueness. However,
more information is needed to substantiate this assumption.
Furthermore, the data proves that there is no consen-
sus on the meaning of PM. After extracting and analyz-
ing the definitions of PM, we found 1459 different endsISMA statement [12].
Figure 2 Annual growth rates of publications on PM in PubMed (2000-2011).
Figure 3 Development of publications on PM in PubMed (2000-2011).
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resulting category system is depicted in Tables 1 and 2
(see Additional file 1 for the complete tables containing
the original definitions’ components).
It is important to note that the term PM is apparently
used across different spheres of the healthcare system
like patient care, research and even drug approval. What
is also interesting is the huge diversity of definitional ele-
ments that we found ranging from “tailored wellness
plan for individuals” to “facilitate validation of health
care products”.
Nevertheless, the debate seems to focus on certain as-
pects. Regarding the ends of PM, the dominant theme is
(improving) the treatment of patients. More than half of
the ends we found in the literature concern therapeutic
interventions and/or their improvement on different di-
mensions like safety, efficiency and effectiveness. More
specifically, the discourse seems to focus on tailoring
therapeutic interventions to a patient’s specific charac-
teristics: about 25% of all ends collected refer to (im-
proved) tailoring of therapeutic interventions. Regarding
the means, the possibilities of molecular or more specif-
ically genetic analysis can be identified as the key aspect
of PM: approximately 50% of all means identified refer
to genetics and genetic information.
Discussion
Six criteria of adequate definitions
As stated above, a precising definition intends to reduce
the vagueness of terms used in practice. Hence, we have
to start with the empirical information about the scien-
tific usage of PM and search for a combination of ends
and means which satisfies certain criteria. This raises the
problem of adequately balancing the two main demands
of a precising definition: staying close to the actual usage
of a term while at the same time focusing its meaning
for the sake of precision. One possible way to approach
this problem would be to include definitional elements
only if they occur with a certain frequency in the litera-
ture. This, however, requires establishing thresholds
above which an element is to be included in our defin-
ition. As such thresholds necessarily are arbitrary, we
chose an analytical approach instead. Accordingly, we
used six criteria of adequate definitions which allowed
us to filter the various components encountered in the
literature. These criteria provide an analytical way to
deal adequately with the two demands: sticking to the
established usage of PM and reducing its vagueness. The
criteria are:
1. A definition must be necessary, i.e. there must not exist
any well-established term equivalent with its definiens,
2. a definition must be neither too broad nor too
narrow, i.e. it must be adequately distinctive (Forinstance, the definition “antibiotics are drugs used to
treat infectious diseases“ is too broad as antifungal
agents – amongst others – are also used to treat
infectious diseases. The definition “antibiotics are
drugs used to treat streptococcal infections”, on the
other hand, is too narrow as other bacterial
infections can also be treated with antibiotics),
3. a definition must not be circular, i.e. the
definiendum must not appear in the definiens,
4. a definition must not be redundant, i.e. it must not
contain any components which are implied by any
other of its components,
5. a definition must not be inconsistent, i.e. it must not
include any logical contradictions, and
6. a definition must not be ambiguous, i.e. the definiens
must be clearly described [8,9].
Obviously, many definitions we found in the literature
do not meet these criteria. For instance, most of the
mentioned ends and means are far too broad to specify
PM adequately: defining PM as pursuing the end of
“treating diseases” is not adequately distinctive (criterion 2),
as any therapeutic measures’ end consists in treating dis-
eases. The same holds for a definition of PM that refers to
the means of “using clinical information”.
Adequate ends of personalized medicine
When taking a closer look at the ends of PM encoun-
tered in the literature (Table 1), the first main category
listed is research. Basic research as well as “research” on
new diagnostic and therapeutic measures is to be ex-
cluded from the ends of PM as it violates criterion 5: in
the medical context,c research is always a means to a
given end, but never an end in itself. Usually – although
not always – the end consists in improving medical mea-
sures or to generate medical knowledge. Therefore it
would not be consistent to include research as an end in
a definition of PM.
The second main category is “drug approval” which
neither is an adequate end for defining PM. After all, we
search for a definition of individualized/personalized
medicine. Accordingly, medicine is the genus of PM that
denotes a main category to which a certain term belongs
and which thereby specifies the limits of a term’s mean-
ing. For instance, “hammer” belongs to the genus “tools”
whereas “rose” belongs to the genus “flowers”. The
genus “medicine”, however, does not imply the term
“drug approval”. Rather, drug approval belongs to the
genus “health policy”. Consequently, including drug ap-
proval in a definition of PM violates criterion 2 as it
would imply an understanding of PM that transcends
the genus “medicine”.
The category “further ends” is also inadequate for de-
fining PM as the terms listed here are either too broad
Table 1 Ends of PM in the literature (short)
Ends in (1459)
1 Research (156) C. Therapy (975)
A. Basic research (43) Diagnosis (68)
On causes and processes of diseases (9) unspecified (18)
On risk factors for diseases (3) tailored diagnosis/diagnostics (28)
On disease classification (18) improved diagnosis/diagnostic measures (22)
To further the development of new treatment measures (13) unspecified (10)
effectiveness/efficacy (5)
B. Research on new diagnostic and prognostic/predictive measures (30) timing (6)
tailored diagnostics (1)
Unspecified (10) Prognosis/Prediction (158)
Regarding tailoring (2) unspecified (4)
Regarding stratification (4) prediction of disease progression/recurrence (5)
Regarding improved diagnostic/prognostic/ predictive measures (9) predictive information guiding clinical decision making (21)
unspecified (2) prediction of treatment effects/effectiveness (60)
effectiveness (6)
efficiency (1) tailoring prognosis/prediction (39)
Regarding companion diagnostics (5) stratification by predicted treatment effects (25)
C. Research on new therapeutic measures (83) improvement of prognostic/predictive measures (4)
Unspecified (15) unspecified (2)
Regarding tailoring (15) safety (1)
Regarding stratification (40) effectiveness/efficacy (1)
Regarding improved treatment measures (13) Treatment (749)
unspecified (5) unspecified (27)
safety (3) choice of therapeutic measure (104)
effectiveness (3) regarding treatment monitoring (12)
efficiency (2) effectiveness/efficacy of treatment (16)
efficiency of treatment (2)
2 Drug approval (14) safety of treatment (6)
A. Improved validation processes (1) treatment outcomes (2)
B. Improved clinical trials (11) tailoring therapy/therapeutic measures (269)
Unspecified (4)
Efficiency (7) stratified therapeutic measure (18)
C. Improved approval processes (2) improvement of therapy/therapeutic measures (293)
unspecified (41)
3 Health care (1202) choice of treatment (32)
A. Health care in general (69) effectiveness/efficacy (92)
Unspecified (1) efficiency (2)
Decision making in health care (3) timing (4)
Tailoring health care (37) safety (83)
Improved health care (28) tailoring treatment measures (39)
unspecified (17)
effectiveness/efficacy (1) 4 Improved health (10)
efficiency (2)
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Table 1 Ends of PM in the literature (short) (Continued)
safety (2) 5 Further ends (77)
choices in health care (1) Unspecified (11)
tailoring health care (5) (Tailored) patient management (3)
B. Prevention (158) Stratification (1)
Risk prognosis/prediction (82) Reduce/control costs (30)
unspecified (52) Improved effectiveness/efficacy (24)
at the individual level (26) Improved timing (1)
at the population level (3) Improved safety (3)
improved risk prognosis/prediction (1) Improved quality of life (4)
Primary prevention (76)
unspecified (34)
tailoring preventive measures (22)
stratified preventive measures (1)
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ing” or “reduce/control costs” do not even (necessarily)
belong to the genus “medicine”, but rather to the genus
“human action” or “business administration”, respect-
ively.d As such they are far too broad to define PM ad-
equately. Somewhat narrower, yet still too broad are
ends like “patient management” or “use stratification”: it
seems to be an end of almost every medical intervention
to manage patients and use stratification. On the other
hand, some of the findings categorized as further ends
like “tailored wellness plan for individuals” are too nar-
row to define PM adequately: medicine necessarily tran-
scends wellness as it ultimately refers to the health of
patients while the term wellness targets only one aspect
of health (if it counts as health related at all). For many
diseases, increases in wellness will not result in improve-
ments in health.
The remaining categories “health care”e and “improved
health” are plausible candidates for inclusion. Before tak-
ing a closer look at their subcategories, we can generally
exclude the subcategories “unspecified” from a definition
of PM. To cut the argument short: all ends contained
here are too broad to define PM adequately. Having said
this, we will first turn to the subcategories “prevention”
and “therapy”. To explain the argumentation underlying
our decisions for exclusion, we have to take a closer look
at the criterion of necessity (1): we assume that a new
term becomes necessary only if changes occur or new
discoveries are made that cannot be described by an
already well-established term (for example, it was neces-
sary to introduce the term “laptop” because the estab-
lished term “personal computer” did not imply themobility that the new device exhibits). Consequently, in
the medical context, a new term is necessary if the ends
and means of medical interventions change in a way that
is not captured by any well-established term. Accord-
ingly, the question is whether any of the subcategories of
“prevention” and “treatment” necessitate the introduc-
tion of a new term. We argue that only categories speak-
ing of improvements fulfill the necessity criterion. The
other subcategories, e.g. “risk prognosis/prediction” or
“primary prevention”, are already well-established terms
which do not justify introducing a novel term. This holds
for both the subcategories of “prevention” and of “ther-
apy”. Accordingly, we excluded all subcategories except
for the ones that refer to an improvement.
Across the categories included thus far we find subcat-
egories that describe different dimensions of improve-
ment: “effectiveness/efficacy”, “timing”, “tailoring”, “choice
of treatment”, “efficiency”, and “safety”. Some of these
specifications can be regarded as inadequate ends for de-
fining PM because they violate the criterion of non-
redundancy (4). In health care we are confronted with a
hierarchy of ends. Certain ends (e.g. better timing of treat-
ment) are not pursued for their own sake, but rather for
the sake of certain higher-order ends (e.g. more effective
treatment). To put it differently: effectiveness, efficiency
and safety of an intervention are the dimensions that de-
fine improvements in healthcare. For instance, a medica-
tion is considered better as an alternative medication if it
either results in a more effective treatment measured on
some health-related indicator, has less side effects (safety)
or is more efficient (i.e. costs less while producing the
same health effect or has a bigger effect at the same costs).
Table 2 Means of PM in the literature (short)
Means in (1025)
1 Research (97) genetic information (417)
A. On individual differences (4) unspecified (19)
B. On genetics/genomics (39) regarding knowledge of genes/genetic variation (215)
Unspecified (11) regarding gene expression (13)
Regarding the influence of genes on disease development/progression (5) regarding genomics/genomic variation (98)
Regarding the influence of genes on drug response (22) regarding the transcriptome (4)
regarding DNA/RNA(6)
Regarding the interaction of genes with other factors that influence disease
development/progression (1)
regarding epigenetics (8)
regarding gene-environment interaction (4)
C. On further factors that influence disease progression/development (8) regarding pharmacogenetics/pharmacogenomics (41)
D. On further factors that influence drug response (4) regarding further points (9)
information on proteomics (35)
E. On biomarkers (40) information on metabolomics (14)
F. On new technologies (2) Further points mentioned (6)
B. Usage of environmental factors/information (33)
2 Application in patient care (928) C. Usage of further individual factors/information (126)
A. Usage of clinical information/clinical indicators (718) Unspecified (77)
Age-related information (4)
Unspecified (11) Phenotypic factors/information (19)
Using information on medical history (12) unspecified (5)
unspecified (6) referring to gender (4)
regarding family history (6) referring to weight (3)
Using biological information/biomarkers (689) referring to membership of a certain (ethnic) group (7)
unspecified (81)
of the individual (21) Personal preferences (4)
of the disease (13) Behavior (22)
on the molecular level (574) unspecified (8)
unspecified (101) referring to nutrition (5)
information on disease pathways (7) referring to lifestyle (6)
referring to toxins (3)
D. Usage of (specific) technology (51)
Unspecified (17)
(New) technology for genetic analysis (30)
Information technology (4)
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and tailoring always imply improvements on one or all of
the dimensions “effectiveness”, “efficiency” and “safety”.
Of course, improving treatment choices, tailoring and
timing does not necessarily reach all of those higher-
order ends. Nevertheless, they are the ultimate ends of
any improvement in health care. Therefore, “effective-
ness”, “efficiency” and “safety” are to be understood as a
triad of ultimate ends of health care innovations that are
implied in any adequate lower-order end. In accordance
with criterion 4 we therefore excluded improvements in“effectiveness”, “efficiency” and “safety” from our defin-
ition as they are necessarily implied by any medical
improvement.
Additionally, improvements in choices of treatment
are themselves implied by improved tailoring of treat-
ment. To be able to choose a treatment – or the right
treatment, respectively – one needs to tailor the treat-
ment to the specific (sub-)type of disease. An improve-
ment in tailoring diagnostic, prognostic, or treatment
measures therefore necessarily leads to an improvement
in treatment choices which is therefore redundant and
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timing of preventive and therapeutic measures as ends
of PM. Those ends, however, imply improvements in
health as ultimate end of any improvement in health
care. The category “improved health” can therefore be
excluded from our definition in accordance with the cri-
terion of non-redundancy (4) following the same line of
argument (improved health as ultimate end is implied by
improvements in tailoring and timing of prevention and
therapy).
Consequently, only “improvement in tailoring and tim-
ing of health care” are plausible ends of PM. They satisfy
criterion 4 and can be considered adequately distinctive
(2), are neither circular (3) nor inconsistent (5) nor am-
biguous (6).
Adequate means of personalized medicine
However, we did not show so far that criterion 1 is ul-
timately satisfied: an improvement could potentially ren-
der a new term necessary, but it does not necessarily.
Ultimately, many changes introduced to the health care
system aim at improving timing and tailoring of preven-
tion or therapy. However, not all of them require the
introduction of a new term (e.g. new screening interven-
tions to improve timing of cancer treatment). However,
as stated above, a new term becomes necessary if the
ends and the means of medical measures change in a
way that is not captured by any well-established term.
Consequently, we have to examine whether we can find
means mentioned in the literature which satisfy criteria
1-6 and thereby specify the ends in a way that criterion
1 is satisfied.
First, the subcategories “unspecified” are excluded
based on a similar argument as brought forward above:
all means contained here are too broad to define PM ad-
equately. Furthermore, only the means “utilizing bio-
logical information and biomarkers on the level of
molecular disease pathways, genetics, proteomics as well
as metabolomics” satisfy criterion 2. All other means in
the category “application in the healthcare system” – ex-
cluding the category “usage of (specific) technology”f – are
not adequately distinctive as they are means employed in
any medical measure (e.g. questions concerning gender
and weight should be part of any routine anamnesis).
Those means – usage of information on the genetic,
proteomic, metabolomic and molecular pathway level –
are adequately distinctive and can, furthermore, be consid-
ered new in the sense requested by criterion 1: they indi-
cate the necessity of a novel term that emphasizes their
use in contrast to using standard information like medical
history or other non-genetic biomarkers (e.g. blood pres-
sure). One could criticize that we call the use of genetic
information new and adequately distinctive as it has long
been informing medical decision-making, especially in thecontext of prenatal diagnostics. However, recent techno-
logical developments have rendered it possible to extend
the informational base to genomic information, epigenetic
information or pharmacogenetic information and also fur-
ther information on the influence of single genes. The
genetic information relevant in our context is of a new
quality. We therefore did not exclude genetic information
on the basis of criteria 1 and 2. It furthermore satisfies cri-
teria 3-6.
Combining ends and means: an adequate definition of
personalized medicine
Accordingly, we can now derive an adequate precising
definition of PM:
PM seeks to improve tailoring and timing of preventive
and therapeutic measures by utilizing biological
information and biomarkers on the level of molecular
disease pathways, genetics, proteomics as well as
metabolomics.
Although it is not clear whether improvement of tai-
loring and timing as ends satisfies criterion 1, tailoring
and timing based on genetic/proteomic/metabolomic/
molecular pathway-related information is conceptually
new and therefore justifies a new term. Moreover, the
definition satisfies criteria 2-6.
Several further remarks are important: First, it might
not be clear why we have not included “research” as a
means in our definition. As stated above, in the medical
context, research is always a means for a given end where
the end usually consists in improving medical measures or
possibilities. In analogy to the argumentation concerning
higher and lower-order ends, whenever medical measures,
e.g. diagnostic tools, are applied, there usage is necessarily
grounded on research. Hence, research is implied in any
medical intervention or means – in the case of PM the
use of information on molecular pathways, genetics, pro-
teomics and metabolomics – and therefore has to be ex-
cluded from our definition in order to satisfy criterion 4.
Second, a similar point applies to the subcategory
“usage of (specific) technology”: like any medical inter-
vention, measures considered to be personalized utilize
certain (specific) technologies. Our definition therefore
analytically implies the utilization of specific technolo-
gies that allow for the measurement and evaluation of
the respective biological information and biomarkers.
“Usage of (specific) technology” must accordingly not be
included in the definition.
Third, our definition contains “improving tailoring of
prevention and therapy” as one end of PM. If this is
understood on the individual level, tailoring becomes
impossible and the definition would be useless: it is im-
possible to find the drug that works perfectly for a single
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vices and pharmaceuticals are clinical trials involving pa-
tients groups and not individual patients. Accordingly,
tailoring means no more than stratification. In turn,
stratification means the detection of sub-groups of pa-
tients that benefit from a certain measure. Tailoring
treatment to a patient can therefore only mean assigning
the patient to a certain sub-group of patients that appear
to respond particularly well to a specific intervention.
Against the background of these practical consider-
ations, we can slightly adapt our definition:
PM seeks to improve stratification and timing of
preventive and therapeutic measures by utilizing
biological information and biomarkers on the level of
molecular disease pathways, genetics, proteomics as
well as metabolomics.
A final remark regards the part of the definition that re-
fers to “improved preventive and therapeutic measures”.
“Improved health care” is equivalent to “improved pre-
ventive and therapeutic measures” as prevention and ther-
apy are what constitutes health care. To put it differently,
improved preventive and therapeutic measures are im-
plied in improved health care and vice versa. According to
criterion 4, we can replace the former by the latter in the
definition, but should not include both formulations. For
reasons of efficiency of formulation we decided to include
the latter arriving at the final definition:
PM seeks to improve stratification and timing of
health care by utilizing biological information and
biomarkers on the level of molecular disease pathways,
genetics, proteomics as well as metabolomics.
Conclusions
Above we have shown that the literature exhibits a huge
variety of definitions of PM. A shared understanding
that could facilitate the discourse on limits and chances
of PM and preselect reasonable arguments is lacking. At
the same time the relative amount of PM definitions
given in the literature has been decreasing over the last
years which we might carefully interpret as a trend: it
gives cause to worry that people conceive PM as a
well-described concept. This is especially worrisome
because interpretations like “tailored wellness plan for
individuals” (ends) or “consider belief of patients”
(means) demonstrate that PM can be misused as a
flexible void with a positive connotation that stake-
holders fill with divergent meanings according to their
interests and preferences.
To forestall such developments, we tried to supply the
discourse with a precising definition. Starting point was
our empirical data. Based on these findings, we analyticallyderived a sufficiently precise definition of PM that satisfies
well-established criteria of adequate definitions:g
PM seeks to improve stratification and timing of
health care by utilizing biological information and
biomarkers on the level of molecular disease pathways,
genetics, proteomics as well as metabolomics.
Hence, an adequate definition of PM is one of type c)
mentioned in the beginning as it refers to treatment tar-
geted at stratified subgroups (e.g. pharmacogenetics).
Interestingly, our definition is also supported by a quan-
titative analysis of PM definitions in the literature. The
number of occurrences of definitional elements suggests
that PM should be understood as the use of genetic in-
formation (417 occurrences) – e.g. knowing of a specific
genetic variation – to improve the treatment of patients
by better tailoring their treatment (308) – e.g. by choos-
ing a drug that does not exhibit severe side effects in
the patient subgroup showing a specific genetic vari-
ation. The fact that our definition converges with the
understanding of the majority suggests that it is widely
acceptable.
This, of course, does not entail that it actually will be
accepted. We hope, however, to stimulate a discussion
on the understanding of PM that might help clarifying
conceptual differences between stakeholders concerned
with PM as well as avoiding unrealistic over- and under-
estimations in the public discourse on PM mentioned in
the beginning.
Finally, four issues need to be addressed: First, we only
included the usage of information on the genetic, prote-
omic, metabolomic and molecular pathway level as
means of PM. In medical practice, however, we will
rarely witness a medical encounter where decisions are
based exclusively on information of such biomarkers.
Rather, in the majority of cases information from both
standard biomarkers (like blood pressure) and new mo-
lecular biomarkers (for instance, the existence of a spe-
cific genetic variant) will be combined to come to a
reasonable treatment decision. Therefore, we realize that
PM can only be understood as an add-on to standard
medical care. Consequently, the aspired improvements
can only be realized by combining both approaches.
Second, regarding our empirical analysis a potential
limitation is that we only screened 1443 full-texts for
definitions of PM, although we found 2312 papers that
included the term PM in title or abstract. This problem
is, however, commonly encountered in systematic re-
views. It can also be criticized that we only searched
PubMed for definitions. Seemingly, this poses the risk of
introducing a bias as it is unclear whether the papers
not scanned by us contained further definitional ele-
ments. However, analyzing our sample of 1443 papers
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emerged after analyzing a certain amount of articles
[11]. Furthermore, we had no reason to suspect that our
sample was significantly different from the general popu-
lation of papers.
Third, one may criticize our exclusion decisions. To
derive a precising definition we had to interpret terms
like “tailored”, “health care” or “adequately distinctive”.
For example, we define health care as being constituted
by preventive and therapeutic measures. Naturally, those
assumptions can be discussed critically as most terms
are not as clearly delineated as would be desirable for
the construction of a definition. However, as these terms
are well-established in scientific discourse and interpret-
ation only becomes necessary at the margin, this should
not weaken our analysis in any significant way. Our def-
inition can therefore help to re-focus the discourse on
PM by reducing its conceptual vagueness.
Fourth, as mentioned above, people debating PM hold
understandings that diverge from what PM technology
actually can achieve. As our results show, PM is not
medicine with a special focus on the interests and pref-
erences of the individual patient. For instance, PM does
not include any reference to an adequate doctor-patient
relationship. Hence, PM as such is not related to the
term patient-centered medicine. Moving towards a more
patient-centered medicine may be desirable, but cannot
be achieved by solely furthering PM technology. To fore-
stall false hopes attached to the concept and accordingly
wrong decisions regarding investments, it might be rea-
sonable to adapt terminology. Stratifying medicine, for
example, would be a more appropriate term than per-
sonalized medicine to describe the developments cur-
rently labeled as PM.
Endnotes
a For pragmatic reasons we will only use the acronym
PM to refer to both individualized as well as personal-
ized medicine in the following. Besides, individualized
and personalized medicine are often used synonymously
in public discourse.
b See Additional file 2 for an overview of all the papers
identified (including information on whether they were
scanned and included in our analysis).
c By medical context we refer to medicine as in med-
ical care. This results from the insight that PM is gener-
ally discussed as a means to improve medical care.
d Of course, “medical decision making” would belong
to the genus “medicine”. The rather general reference to
“decision making”, however, does not necessarily belong
to the genus “medicine”. Therefore, we refrained from
including “decision making” in our definition.
e By “health care” we understand medical care both on
the population and on the individual level.f We will return to that category later.
g Cf. [13] for an alternative, purely analytically de-
rived definition of PM. By characterizing our definition
as sufficiently precise, we want to point out that it ob-
viously cannot be perfectly precise. The construction of a
perfectly precise definition would demand defining every
element of the definiendum, e.g. the terms “biomarker”,
“proteomics” or “metabolomics”. It is sufficiently precise
in the sense that it can decrease the chances of misusing
the term PM. For this purpose, it is not necessary to pro-
vide an exact definition of terms like proteomics or
metabolomics. Rather, it is sufficient to point out that
certain biological sub-disciplines are decisive for PM’s
development and implementation.
Additional files
Additional file 1: Ends and Means of PM in the Literature (Long).
Additional file 2: Searched Papers Containing PM in Title/Abstract.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Authors’ contributions
SS initiated the study and contributed to conception and design, acquisition
of data, analysis and (analytical) interpretation of data. He was involved in
drafting the manuscript and revised it. CK contributed to data analysis and
interpretation and was involved in drafting the manuscript as well as
revision. TB contributed to acquisition of data and revised the manuscript.
WHR contributed to conception and design and was involved in drafting
and revising the manuscript. GM contributed to data interpretation and was
involved in drafting and revising the manuscript. All authors gave final
approval of the paper.
Acknowledgments
This study was carried out as part of the research project “Individualized
Health Care: Ethical, Economic and Legal Implications for the German Health
Care System,” funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and
Research (reference number 01GP1006). We would like to thank our fellow
colleagues at the Institute of Ethics, History and Theory of Medicine (Ludwig-
Maximilians-University Munich), Galia Assadi, Orsolya Friedrich, Ralf Jox, Katja
Kühlmeyer, and Oliver Rauprich for their support with regard to content and
methodological matters. Finally, we are thankful to the reviewers Erik
Gustavsson and Lars Sandman for important remarks on an earlier version of
this paper.
Author details
1Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich, Institute of Ethics, History and
Theory of Medicine, Munich, Germany. 2Helmholtz Zentrum Munich, German
Research Center for Environmental Health, Institute of Health Economics and
Health Care Management, Neuherberg, Germany. 3Ludwig-Maximilians-
University Munich, Institute and Outpatient Clinic for Occupational, Social
and Environmental Medicine, Munich, Germany.
Received: 10 September 2013 Accepted: 13 December 2013
Published: 21 December 2013
References
1. Vollmann J: Persönlicher – besser – kostengünstiger? Kritische
medizinethische Anfragen an die “personalisierte Medizin“. Eth Med 2013,
25:233–241.
2. Schleidgen S, Marckmann G: Alter Wein in neuen Schläuchen? Ethische
Implikationen der Individualisierten Medizin. Eth Med 2013, 25:223–231.
3. Müller H: Chancen und Risiken der “individualisierten Medizin“ für das
Gesundheitssystem. Welt Krankenversicherung 2012, 2:40–41.
Schleidgen et al. BMC Medical Ethics 2013, 14:55 Page 12 of 12
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/14/554. Dabrock P: Die konstruierte Realität der sog. individualisierten Medizin. In
Sozialethische und theologische Anmerkungen, Medizin nach Mass:
Individualisierte Medizin – Wunsch und Wirklichkeit. Edited by Schumpelick
V, Vogel B. Freiburg: Herder; 2011:239–267.
5. Bondio MG, Michl S: Individualisierte Medizin: Die neue Medizin und ihre
Versprechen. DÄ 2010, 107:A1062–A1064.
6. Whitehead AN, Russel B: Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press; 1910.
7. Brown JR: What is a definition? Found Sci 1998, 3:111–132.
8. Hurley PJ: A concise introduction to logic. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth
Publishing; 2007.
9. Copi IM, Cohen C: Introduction to logic. New York, London: Macmillan; 1990.
10. Ogino S, Galon J, Fuchs CS, Dranoff G: Cancer immunology – analysis of
host and tumor factors for personalized medicine. Nat Rev Clin Oncol
2011, 8:711–719.
11. Thomas J, Harden A: Methods for the thematic synthesis of qualitative
research in systematic reviews. BMC Med Res Meth 2008, 8:45.
12. Liberati A, Altman DG, Tetzlaff J, Mulrow C, Gøtzsche PC, Ioannidis JPA,
Clarke M, Devereaux PJ, Kleijnen J, Moher D: The PRISMA statement for
reporting systematic reviews and meta-analyses of studies that evaluate
healthcare interventions: explanations and elaborations. BMJ 2009,
339:b2700.
13. Langanke M, Lieb W, Erdmann P, Dörr M, Fischer T, Kroemer H, Flessa S,
Assel H: Was ist Individualisierte Medizin? Zur terminologischen
Justierung eines schillernden Begriffs. ZME 2012, 58:295–314.
doi:10.1186/1472-6939-14-55
Cite this article as: Schleidgen et al.: What is personalized medicine:
sharpening a vague term based on a systematic literature review. BMC
Medical Ethics 2013 14:55.Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central
and take full advantage of: 
• Convenient online submission
• Thorough peer review
• No space constraints or color figure charges
• Immediate publication on acceptance
• Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar
• Research which is freely available for redistribution
Submit your manuscript at 
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
